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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the price and quantity competition in an oligopoly with
capacity constraints; Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. We assume that con-
sumers take into account not only the prices but also the probability of purchase
at each retail store. The probability of purchase is introduced as a function of the
quantity and the number of consumers as in Barro and Romer (1987). The equi-
librium number of consumer is determined by the interaction among consumers.
In the preceding Bertrand-Edgeworth competition models, two rationing rules
have been proposed; the efficient rationing rule and the proportional rationing
rule. We consider a consumer’s rational behavior instead of these rules, and
show that there is a range of a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibrium above
marginal cost with pure strategy.
The Cournot Competition is a quantity competition in which the equilibrium
price is uniquely determined above marginal cost. Bertrand criticized Cournot.
If firms compete in prices, the equilibrium price equals to the marginal cost.
Thus, the competitive prioe will be appeared even under oligopoly. This is the
famous Bertrand Paradox. There are two main keywords to solve this paradox:
the product differentiation and the capacity constraints. We focus on the lat-
ter. The representative model of capacity constraints is the Bertrand-Edgeworth
competition. This model needs the rationing rule sinoe firms face the residual
demand when they raise the prices more than the other firms’ prices. As noted
above, two leading rationing rules have been proposed. However, these rationing
rules are merely used as a substitute for a complete analysis of consumer be-
havior (Tirole 1988).
There are two main purposes in this paper. One is to characterize a rationing
by introducing the interactions among consumers. There are homogenous con-
sumers with reservation utility for an indivisible good $v$ . Consumers take into
163
account the probability of purchase at each retail store as a function of quantity
and the number of consumers. From these assumptions, the following expected
surplus function at firm $i$ is derived:
$V_{i}(p_{i},q_{i},n_{i})=\lambda_{i}(q_{i},n_{i})(v-p_{i})$ .
Another main purpose is to show that there exists a continuum of Nash
equilibria in pure-strategy in the case that the total capacity level equals to
the total number of consumers. There is an existence problem in the Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition. Edgeworth pointed out that pure-strategy equilibria
may not exist unless demand is highly elastic. With either rationing rule, the
only possible candidates for pure-strategy equilibria are uniquely determined
under some conditions (Tirole 1988; Vives 1999). In the case of discrete choices
with homogenous reservation utility $v$ , the efficient rationing rule and the pro-
portional rationing rule coincide with each other. Equilibrium price is uniquely
determined at $v$ , a monopoly price level, in the case of the total capacity level
equals to the total number of consumers. Our results show that the rationing
by introducing the interactIons among consumers leads to a quite different con-
clusion.
2 Model
Consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth (B-E) competition in the retail market for an
Indivisible Good. Suppose that there are capacity constraints. There are $N$
consumers. Let $N$ be a large number. In the standard B-E model, a common
downward sloping demand functions are given. A contingent demand func-
tion is derived from the function with a rationing rule. In our paper, on the
other hand, we derived a contingent demand function from consumers’ discrete
choices. Suppose that they are all identical and have a reservation utility $v(>0)$
for a good.
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The quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer is defined:
$u(x, m)=vx+m$ , (1)
where $x\in\{0,1\}$ and $m>0$ denote the number of an indivisible good and the
residual income respectively. At the begging, they choose whether to enter or
not the market. After they enter the market, there are two steps. The first step
is to choose a store. Suppose that it is prohibitively expensive to change the
store. As in Stiglitz (1989), this assumption seems proper for the goods that is
not so durable like milk , eggs and breads. It is consumed one per week or day.
Hence, budget constraint at each firm $i$ becomes $p_{i}x+m=y$ , where $y$ denotes
income. Substituting the budget constraint into $m$ in the utility function at
firm $i$ :
$U_{i}(x,p_{i},y)=(v-p_{i})x+y$ . (2)
Suppose that the representative consumer can observe the number of supply
$q$: and shoppers $n_{i}$ at firm $i$ and that he takes into account the probability of
purchase $\lambda_{i}$ at firm $i$ as a function of $q_{2}$ and $n_{i}$ :
$\lambda_{i}(q_{i}, n:)=\{\begin{array}{ll}1, if 0\leq n_{i}<q_{i},A_{-}n. if q_{i}\leq n:\leq N.\end{array}$ (3)
Then, the expected utility function at firm $i$ can be defined:
$\overline{V}_{1}(p_{i}, q_{i},n_{i})=\lambda_{t}(q_{i},n_{i})U_{i}(1,p_{i},y)+(1-\lambda_{i}(q_{i},n:))U_{i}(0,p_{i},y)$
$=\lambda_{i}(q_{i},n_{i})(v-p:)+y$ . (4)
The utility when the consumer doesn’t enter the market is $y$ . Then it is useful




From (3), it also can be written as,
$V_{i}(p_{i},q_{i}, n_{i})=\{\begin{array}{ll}(v-p_{i}), if 0\leq n_{i}<q_{i},Ln.\cdot(v-p_{i}), if q_{i}\leq n_{i}\leq N.\end{array}$ (6)
The function $V_{i}$ appears in Figure 1(a). Since the utility is $y$ when a consumer
doesn’t enter the market, all consumers participate the market if $(v-p_{i})$ is
positive. Thus the sum of the number of shoppers at each firm equals to the
number of consumers $N$ . If there are two firms, $n_{1}+n_{2}=N$ , Functions $V_{1}$ and
$V_{2}$ can be depicted at once (Figure $1(b)$ ). From Figure l(b), it can be seen the
Figure 1: Expected Surplus and the Equilibrium Number of Consumers
equilibrium number of consumers at firm $i$ for $i=1,2$. More precisely, it can
be derived by solving the following equation for $n_{i}$ :
$V_{i}(p_{i},q_{1},n_{i})=V_{j}(p_{j},q_{j}, N-n_{i})$ . (7)
From (7), we can derive the contingent demand for firm 1 is given by
if $q_{1}+q_{2}\geq N$ ,
$n_{1}(p_{1};p_{2},q_{1},q_{2})=\{\begin{array}{ll}[Matrix] q_{1}, if p_{1}<p_{2},(\frac{q_{1}}{q_{1}+q_{2}})N, if p_{1}=p_{2},N-[Matrix] q_{2}, if p_{1}>p_{2},\end{array}$ (8)
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if $q_{1}+q_{2}<N$ ,
$n_{1}$ ($p_{1}$ ; P2, $q_{1},$ $q_{2}$ ) $=\{\begin{array}{ll}[Matrix] q_{1}, if p_{1}\leq a_{1)}(\frac{(v-p_{1})q_{1}}{(v-p\iota)q_{1}+(v-p_{2})q_{2}})N, if a_{1}<p_{1}\leq b_{1},N-(\frac{v-p}{v-p_{1}})q_{2}, if p_{1}>b_{1},\end{array}$ (9)
where
$a_{1}=v- \frac{(v-p_{2})(N-q_{2})}{q_{1}}$ , td $b_{1}=v- \frac{(v-p_{2})q_{2}}{N-q_{1}}$ . (10)
When the quoted prices are the same in the case $q_{1}+q_{2}>N$ , demand is split
in proportion to the supplies of the firms.
In a parallel fashion the contingent demand for firm 2, $n_{2}(p_{2}; p_{1},q_{2}, q_{1})$ can
be given.
3 Equilibrium
There $are$ two firms. Firm $i$ sets prioe $p_{i}$ and quantity $q_{1}$ with $0$ marginal
cost. Suppose that there is the capacity constraint $q_{i}\leq k_{i}$ where $k_{i}$ denotes the
capacity level of firm $i$ . Further, suppose that $k_{i}<N$ for $i=1,2$, and firms take
$k_{i}$ as given. At prices and capacity levels $(p_{1},p_{2}, k_{1}, k_{2})$ , the quantity chosen by
firm $i$ would be $q_{i}= \min\{k_{i},n_{i}(p_{1}; p_{2}, k_{1}, k_{2})\}$ , and its payoff $\pi_{i}(p_{i},p_{j}, k_{i}, k_{j})=$
PROPOSITION 3.1 If $k_{1}+k_{2}>N$ , then an equilibnum in pure strategy
does not enist.
proof In the case $k_{1}+k_{2}>N$ , from (8), the profits of fim 1 can be wriuen
$as$
$\pi_{1}(p_{1},p_{2}, k_{1)}k_{2})=\{\begin{array}{ll}p_{1}k_{1}, if p_{1}\leq p_{2},p_{1}(\frac{k_{1}}{k_{1}+k_{2}})N, if p_{1}=p_{2},p_{1}(N-[Matrix] k_{2}), if p_{1}>p_{2}.\end{array}$ (11)
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Notice that the profit is not continuous at $p_{1}=p_{2}$ . The response function of
firm 1 when $p_{1}>p_{2}$ can be derived as
$\tilde{R}_{1}(p_{2}, k_{2})=v-\sqrt{\frac{v(v-p_{2})k_{2}}{N}}$ . (12)
It can be seen that $\tilde{R}_{1}(p_{2}, k_{2})>p_{2}$ when $p_{2}<\tilde{p}_{2}$ , where $\tilde{p}_{2}=(1-k_{2}/N)v$ .
The optimal strategy for firm 1 when $p_{2}\geq\tilde{p}_{2}$ is to set price $p_{1}$ less than
but infinitely close to $p_{2}$ . This strategy is the same as Bertrand competition.
However, we can easily seen that $\tilde{R}_{1}(0, k_{2})>0$ and hence firm 1 can earn some
positive profit when $p_{2}=0$ . The similar argument applies to fim 2. Therefore,
there is no equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 has an analogy with that Edgeworth pointed out. This result
is caused by the capacity constraint rather than by the rationing rules. Thus,
this paper doesn’t focus on this proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.2 If $k_{1}+k_{2}=N$ , there exists a continuum of symmetric
Nash equilibria $p^{*}$ in pure strategy in the range of $[\tilde{p}^{*}, v]$ , where $\tilde{p}^{*}=\max\{(1-$
$k_{1}/N)v,$ $(1-k_{2}/N)v$}.
proof In the case $k_{1}+k_{2}=N$ , from (8), the profits of firm 1 can be written
$as$
$\pi_{1}(p_{1},p_{2}, k_{1}, k_{2})=\{\begin{array}{ll}p_{1}k_{1}, if p_{1}\leq p_{2},p_{1}(N-[Matrix] k_{2}), if p_{1}>p_{2}.\end{array}$ (13)
In this case, profit is continuous at $p_{1}=p_{2}$ .
$R_{1}(p_{2}, k_{2})=\{\begin{array}{ll}v-\sqrt{\frac{v(v-p_{2})k_{2}}{N}}, if 0\leq \text{ } <\tilde{p}_{2},p_{2}, if \tilde{p}_{2}\leq p_{2}\leq v,\end{array}$ (14)
where $\overline{p}_{2}=(1-k_{2}/N)v$ . Firm l’s reaction function (14) appears in Figure 2.
Similarly, firm 2 $s$ reaction function can be derived. If $k_{1}=k_{2}$ , then $\tilde{p}_{1}=\tilde{p}_{2}=$
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$v/2$ . In this case, there is a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria in $[v/2, v]$
(Figure 4 $(a)$). If $k_{1}<k_{2}$ , then $\tilde{p}_{1}>\tilde{p}_{2}$ . In this case, the minimum of the
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Figuoe 3: A Continuum of Symmetric Nash Equilibria
This is the main proposition in this paper. Theoe is a range of equilibrium
prioe levels. However, the realized equilibrium price level is unique even under
the asymmetric capacity levels. It is also found that the equilibrium range is
maximum at the same capacity levels.
169
PROPOSITION 3.3 If $k_{1}+k_{2}<N$ , there eansts a Nash equihb$7\dot{\tau}ump^{*}$ in
pure strategy. The equilibrium price $p^{*}$ equals to the monopoly $p_{7}\dot{v}$ce level: $i.e.$ ,
$p^{*}=v$ .
proof In the case $k_{1}+k_{2}<N$ , from (9), the profits of firm 1 can be written
$as$
$\pi_{1}(p_{1},p_{2}, k_{1}, k_{2})=\{\begin{array}{ll}k_{1}, if p_{1}\leq b,N-(\frac{v-}{v-}gp_{1}\geq)k_{2}, if p_{1}>b_{1},\end{array}$ (15)
where $b_{1}=v- \frac{(v-p_{2})k_{2}}{N-k_{1}}$ It is found that $b_{1}$ is upward sloping linear function
in $p_{2}$ and $b_{1}=v(1-k_{2}/(N-k_{1}))$ when $p_{2}=0,$ $b_{1}=v$ when $p_{2}=v$ . This
is the reaction function of firm 1. Similarly, the reaction jfunction of firm 2 is


















Figuoe 4: Symmetric Nash Equilibrium
This result is intuitively obvious under this setting. The market is completely
separated and the firm has monopoly power to the residual demand.
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4 Conclusion
This paper finds that there exists the equilibrium price levels in pure strategy.
There are the ranges of the equilibrium price levels if the total capacity level
equals to the number of consumers. If the total capacity level is less than the
number of consumers, the equilibrium price would be monopoly one. This result
is caused by the capacity constraints and the demand structure. Notioe that
under two leading rationing rules, proportional and efficient, the equilibrium
price level becomes monopoly prioe if $k_{1}+k_{2}\leq N$ . Therefore, the contribution of
this paper is finding of proposition 3.2. This result is caused by introducing the
strategic interaction of firms and consumers combined with capacity constraints.
The implication of Proposition 3.3 is that there exists price dispersion be-
tween several locally separating oligopoly markets in spaoe or in time like Gas
stations or service prioe of eggs. The equilibrium price levels has some range in
these cases.
Like Kreps and Sheinkman (1983), introducing the stage of the determina-
tion of capacity levels among firms and to investigate whether the results of
Proposition 3.2 are the next program of our research. It seems that the case of
Proposition ?? disappear sinoe the firm slightly reduoe the capacity level and
intends to have a monopoly power. However, it might be not true if the free
entry is allowed. As in Davidson and Deneckere (1986), we have to investigate
which rule might be occur in the long-run equilibrium.
In this paper, comparing the results between the two rationing rules and our
model in the specific demand structure. Introducing the heterogenous reser-
vation utility levels and downward sloping demand function as a limit case is
another extension of our research.
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